The Unbanking of America
A white paper by Phillip Shmerling
Part II: The Great Boundary Narrowing

Chapter 5The Gap-Fillers

With the introduction of the Depression regulations, huge gaps in the capital ecosystem began to form, especially around speculative equity investments for which the process of raising capital was now regulated by Glass-Steagall. But it was not until the markets began to correct and until a major global war started and ended over the next decade that the need for new sources of capital arose. As banks were restricted from making speculative investments, the market for high-risk equity investments needed a place to go. Chapter 5 takes us forward to the 1940s, where we witness the birth of the first venture capital firms.

1946Venture capital emergence from the banking establishment

Portrait of Georges Doriot in a U.S. Army uniform, 1942.
Georges Doriot in 1942, four years before he founded ARD. U.S. Army Signal Corps, via Wikimedia Commons (public domain).

The year after World War II ended, a Harvard Business School professor named Georges Doriot, together with the president of MIT and a group of New England finance professionals, founded the American Research and Development Corporation, which was believed to be the first true venture capital firm.1 They founded ARD because the institutions they themselves ran were no longer permitted to do what their grandfathers’ banks had done, which is put patient money behind unproven enterprises.

This is also where we see the effect on cost to the private companies that now had to seek capital outside of the banking ecosystem. As an example, in 1957, ARD invested $70,000 in a startup called Digital Equipment Corporation and took roughly 70% of the company (with a $30,000 loan to follow).2 That stake was worth some $355 million by 1971. This transaction is widely celebrated as the founding legend of venture capital. But from the founders’ perspectives, a business that in 1880 might have financed its growth with renewable bank loans and kept its ownership now surrendered 70% of itself to get any funding at all, at an implied cost of $355 million. The money was still available, but the terms changed by an order of magnitude. Of course, since competition has grown in the VC market since the 1940s, the terms are not quite as egregious, but it is still considerably more expensive than getting funds in the early days of banking.

1958Congress sees (and attempts to close) the gap

In the mid-1950s, Congress started to notice the gap for small business and startup company financing and asked the Federal Reserve to study whether small businesses had access to the capital it needed. The Fed’s answer, delivered in 1958, was no. It found a gap in long-term credit and equity capital for small firms left by the Depression-era Acts. Congress responded with the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, which created the SBIC program to fill the gap. The congressional findings showed that commercial banks could not furnish long-term financing, that issuing public securities was prohibitively expensive for small companies (due to Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934), and that private placements had not solved the problem.3

The United States government formally concluded, in 1958, that the banking system it had modelled (in good conscience, I want to add) could not sufficiently finance the growth of small business.

However, rather than update the banking system, it built a subsidized workaround through the SBIC program and moved on. The SBA itself had been created five years earlier (1953) on the same logic.4 But even with these programs, the gap remained.

1979The flood into venture capital

For its first three decades, venture capital stayed small and clubby because the biggest pools of capital, namely pensions, were not allowed to invest in high-risk assets. ERISA, the 1974 pension law, required pension managers to invest by a “prudent man” standard, which was read to exclude anything as risky as a venture fund.

Things changed in 1979 when the Labor Department clarified the rule. “Prudence” would now be judged at the level of the whole portfolio, not the individual investment.5 Because it considered that a prudent man would weigh a full portfolio of assets rather than just the risk profile of a single asset alone, they determined that pension money could now flow into venture capital and private equity.

But the growth of private markets did not stop there. A new crisis was coming that would further limit banks’ lending boundaries. The culprit this time was our old friend from Chapter 4 - Regulation Q.

Notes

  1. On ARD’s founding (1946) by Georges Doriot with Karl Compton (MIT), Ralph Flanders, and Boston financial institutions, see Harvard Business School, Baker Library, Georges F. Doriot collection; Spencer E. Ante, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital (Harvard Business Press, 2008). ARD was organized as a publicly traded closed-end investment company. ↩
  2. ARD invested $70,000 for approximately 70% of Digital Equipment Corporation in 1957, with a $30,000 loan to follow; the stake was valued at approximately $355 million by 1971 (Ante, Creative Capital, p. 168 - 172). ARD merged into Textron in 1972. See HBS Baker Library, Doriot collection (“DEC”); American Research and Development Corporation records. ↩
  3. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, P.L. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689, § 102 (statement of policy); Congressional Research Service, SBA Small Business Investment Company Program (R41456), recounting the 1958 Federal Reserve Board study and congressional findings. ↩
  4. Small Business Act of 1953, P.L. 83-163. ↩
  5. ERISA (1974); U.S. Department of Labor, “prudent man” rule clarification, 44 Fed. Reg. 37221 (June 26, 1979), codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1. ↩