The Great Boundary Narrowing
We left Part I feeling confident and comfortable in our new banking system. Nationally-chartered and state-chartered banks had similar restrictions in what they could consider “bankable” to better ensure the safety of customer deposits. The Federal Reserve was created to backstop any future crashes by serving as a lender of last resort to banks facing runs. Customers felt their deposits were safe and that, in the case of the next panic, the Federal Reserve would shore up their banks.
But in Part II, we will see that the regulators’ jobs were not quite done. With new unforeseen risks and surprises, in some cases coming from capital markets that formed outside of the regulated banks to fill the gaps created as banking boundaries were narrowed, came new challenges and new bogeymen to address. During the periods encompassed in Part II, we will see most of the major regulations that aimed to build confidence in our capital markets come into being, setting up what would bring us closer to modern banking as we know it today.
Chapter 4The Great Depression
The Federal Reserve was supposed to have prevented the crash that led to the Great Depression. The 1913 Act gave America a lender of last resort and an elastic currency, and Part I closed on the assumption that the problem had been solved. The Fed changed how money moved through the banking system, but it did nothing about the structure of the system itself. America entered the 1920s with roughly 30,000 banks, the vast majority of which were single-office institutions, each one tied to the fortunes of one town and, therefore, often one crop or one industry.1
Through most of the Roaring ‘20s, things were not quite as roaring for banks. When farm prices collapsed after the wartime boom from WWI, rural banks began to fail; not in a dramatic wave, but steadily, by the hundreds each year. More than 5,700 banks suspended operations between 1921 and 1929, before the stock market crash.2 Because the victims were small, rural, and scattered, it was hardly seen as a national emergency. Reflecting this lack of alarm, when Congress passed the McFadden Act in 1927, it let national banks open branches within their home cities where state law allowed, but it left the prohibition on interstate branching in place, keeping most banks locked into the undiversified geography that was killing them.3
Then came 1929. The 1929 crash fueled the banking crisis that had been assembling for a decade. Waves of panic ran through the system in 1930, 1931, and again in early 1933; depositors ran, banks called loans, borrowers defaulted, and more banks failed. The Federal Reserve, the institution created for precisely this moment, failed to act, contributing to mass failures (in addition to the many failed banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve System). Between 1930 and 1933, more than 9,000 American banks suspended operations. Those banks held roughly $7 billion in deposits, with about $1.3 billion ultimately lost after the failed banks were liquidated.4 There was no deposit insurance. When a bank failed, depositors could wait years to get back any part of their money.
When Congress sat down to diagnose the catastrophe, it could have concluded that the problem was structural: too many small banks that were undiversified, that were unable to branch, and that were inadequately backstopped. Congress did address structure in part. The Banking Act of 1933 let national banks branch statewide wherever state law allowed state banks to, and it created deposit insurance. But it determined that the problem was what banks were doing with the money and not only how they were structured. Particularly, it was their entanglement with the securities markets - i.e. making risky investments with depositor funds.
The response was the Banking Act of 1933, known to history by the names of its sponsors, Glass-Steagall. It did three things that shrunk the boundaries of banking more than any regulation had before:
- It separated commercial banking from investment banking. Before the Banking Act of 1933, a bank could take deposits and make loans, and it could underwrite and invest in securities. With Glass-Steagall, it could no longer do both. The institutions that had since the days of the railroads connected American savings to American enterprise at every level of risk were now split by law. The full-service capital shop was dead.
- It created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, which should sound familiar to you), which created a backstop for depositors, but not the banks (this will come back into play shortly). Deposit insurance worked, but it also created something subtler and more permanent: once the government guarantees the deposits, it now has a deep interest in what the bank does with them. Every argument about what banks “should” be allowed to fund, from 1933 to today, ultimately traces back to this bargain.
- Although its deposit-rate ceilings were phased out by 1986, it remains highly relevant for future crises (and therefore our paper) it imposed Regulation Q. Reg Q created a ceiling on the interest rates banks could pay their depositors. If you can imagine for a minute walking into a bank and asking them to pay you 5.0% on a money market account and the bank saying, “Sorry. The government won’t let us pay more than 4.5%,” that is what it would have been like, even if inflation was 9% (we will come back to that). Congress reasoned that competition for deposits had pushed banks into risky lending to cover high funding costs – i.e. paying high interest rates to depositors. If you put a cap on what banks pay, the logic went, then you can control what they need to earn and therefore what level of risk they feel they need to take when they fund a loan. We will see how the Reg Q story ends in Chapter 6; preview: it was a time bomb with a 40-year fuse.5
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 created many other rules that are relevant to finance, but for our purposes, these three components were most relevant. They completed the new banking architecture, in addition to routing the financing of larger enterprises through registered, disclosed, SEC-supervised markets. By the late 1930s the shape of modern American finance was set: banks on one side, doing short, safe, self-liquidating lending out of insured deposits; securities markets on the other, serving companies big enough to afford them.
And for all of the companies in between that were no longer qualified to borrow from the banking system? Those in-betweens are where the next 90 years of our story begins anew.